Re: Geopolitics-US Army War College/National Security Seminar Learnings.

I had the good fortune to be one of the civilian participants in this year’s NSS. I am bound by Chatham House Rules and offer no attribution, but I wanted to share some high-level observations.

In a parallel universe, had I not gone down the road of finance/investing, I might have wound up working in intelligence or some kind of geopolitical thinktank. Needless to say, I was thrilled to be nominated to participate in this year’s NSS.

The USAWC is an elite institution that provides a master’s degree in Strategic Studies for senior military officers, prepping them for senior leadership assignments. It was founded in 1901 by Pres. T. Roosevelt’s Secretary of War, Elihu Root. It is based in Carlisle, PA.

The NSS is the capstone event at the end of an academic year that brings in civilians from different backgrounds to participate in interactive discussions about various topics ranging from geopolitics to diplomacy.

The breadth of expertise within my seminar group alone was broad and impressive, ranging from Special Ops to Military Intelligence to Logistics.

The primary theme for the week was how the 4 primary Instruments of National Power (DIME) interact with one another: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic. I learned a ton about the first 3; I provided my observations on the latter.

From my perspective, there is big commonality between the military decision-making process and investing/portfolio management: we assess imperfect/incomplete information, do our best to ascertain risk/reward, and make calculated bets accordingly.

As we discussed Thucydides’ Trap relating to a rising China challenging US hegemony, a quote that stuck out to me was that “the nature of war is unchanging over time, because it is a human endeavor.”

Investing too is a “human endeavor” and is similarly unchanging because the psychology of Fear and Greed never changes. This is why my favorite investment book _Reminiscences of a Stock Operator_, written in 1923, is completely relevant today.

Nevertheless, in studying Thucydides’ Trap, it is important not just to glean similarities from history but to perceive the DIFFERENCES so that we may learn how

to avoid conflicts. A great book I’ve read on this topic is _Destined For War_ by Graham Allison.

From an Informational standpoint, we talked about the importance of asking the right questions in a “VUCA” (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, Ambiguous) world. In particular: 1) Why...? 2) What if...? 3) How...?

As in investing, having a beginner’s mind is paramount. The 4-year old mind is the ultimate questioning machine. “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so. “ – Mark Twain

From a Military standpoint, it’s important to remember the many non-war functions: 1) ally support, 2) natural disaster/humanitarian crises support, 3) international security support. I liked the acronym “MOOTWa”: Military Operations Other Than War.

Strategically, there seems to be a shift away from the focus on counter-insurgency of the last 20 years to a more “multi-domain” focus that covers new threats: AI, quantum computing, hypersonic tech, cyberwarfare, etc.

We talked about the different areas of focus for the DOD vs the DHS and how these new threats that blur the lines between “external” and “internal” require new inter- agency cooperation.

Diplomatically, it is important to understand that “winning a war is never final,” because one must always contend with what comes after. An interesting discussion offshoot of this was how to deal with proxy wars.

One fascinating thread of discussion: What constitutes a “vital interest” to the US? In particular, I brought up the topic of Taiwan, not due to its geopolitical importance within China’s First Island Chain, but also its ECONOMIC importance given TSMC.

We talked at length about China’s geographic deficiencies relative to ours, as brought up previously in this thread:

In particular, I am fascinated by China’s attempts to overcome its dependencies on choke points for energy through its current OBOR initiatives. Apparently, the term “Malacca Strait Dilemma” is not a popular conversation topic at CCP cocktail parties:

China understands that our geographic superiority + blue-water superiority make our homeland difficult to invade. As a result, they are investing heavily in SPACE – and not just to beat us to Mars. Read William Forstchen’s _One Second After_. Very, very scary.

Turning to ME policy, although there seems to be a long-term pivot away from the “counter-terrorism” focus of the last 20 years, I observed that this may be an area where Economic initiatives like ESG are directly at odds with a Military initiative to disengage.

Not only are we going to be dependent on ME oil again, we are making ourselves dependent on REE from China.

Not surprisingly, 3 key concerns around the ME have to do with 1) potential rise of Iran as regional hegemon, 2) the security/stability of the region, 3) the free flow of natural resources within the region.

Going back to choke points, there are 3 key reasons why we are unlikely to fully disengage from the ME: 1) Bab-el-Mandeb, 2) Strait of Hormuz, 3) Suez Canal.

As with all great learning experiences, this one left me with even more questions than answers, and I come away with it with even more respect and admiration for our men and women in uniform. We are in very good hands.

Last two paragraphs of this article touch upon many of the issues I raised in this thread regarding the importance of Taiwan as well as our vulnerabilities to EMP.